Operation Cobalt Whisper: Threat Actor Targets Multiple Industries Across Hong Kong and Pakistan.
Contents
- Introduction
- Key Targets.
- Industries Affected.
- Geographical Focus.
- Initial Findings.
- Looking into the decoy-document – I
- Looking into the decoy-document – II
- Infection Chain.
- Technical Analysis
- Stage 1 – Malicious LNK Script & VBScript.
- Stage 2 – Malicious Cobalt Strike Beacon.
- Hunting and Infrastructure.
- Conclusion
- SEQRITE Protection
- IOCs
- MITRE ATT&CK
- Authors
Introduction
SEQRITE Labs APT-Team has recently uncovered a campaign targeting various industries such as the Defense Sector in Pakistan and predominantly researchers from Hong Kong. Tracked as Operation Cobalt Whisper, the entire campaign heavily leverages the use of a post-exploitation tool Cobalt Strike, which is deployed using obfuscated VBScript. A total of 20 infection chains have been identified so far along with additional individual samples, where 18 of them target Hong Kong and two target Pakistan where over 30 decoy files have been identified.
In this blog, we will explore the technical details of one of the campaigns we encountered during our initial analysis and examine the various stages of the infection chain, starting with a deep dive into the decoy documents. We will then look into the common Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), such as the use of malicious VBScript and LNK payloads employed by this threat actor across most campaigns. These methods facilitate the in-memory execution of the Cobalt Strike implant, which is delivered alongside these lures in an archive file.
Key Targets
Industries Affected
- Defense Industry
- Electrotechnical Engineering
- Energy (Hydropower, Renewable Energy)
- Civil Aviation
- Environmental Engineering
- Academia and Research Institutions
- Medical Science Institutions.
- Cybersecurity Researchers.
Geographical Focus
- Hong Kong
- Pakistan
Initial Findings
Recently, on 9th of September 2024, our team found a malicious RAR archive, which surfaced both on various sources like VirusTotal, where the RAR has been used as preliminary source of infection, containing multiple decoys with PDF and LNK extensions and a final Cobalt Strike implant. This was also found by other threat researchers as well.
The RAR archive contains a malicious LNK named, “附件1：《2024年度中国电工技术学会科学技术奖推荐提名书》（技术发明奖和科技进步奖）填报说明(2024年8月新版).pdf.lnk”, which is responsible for execution of another malicious batch script named as O365.vbs. The VBScript is mostly responsible for decoding the Cobalt Strike beacon on disk, known as cache.bak, this is further executed, which connects back to the command-and-control server. Let us look into the two decoy documents.
Infection Chain
Looking into the decoy-document – I
Upon looking into the first decoy document known as subscription.db, it turns out that this lure is linked to the Electronic Society of China, focused on nominations for the award ceremony.
The contents and the entire decoy confirm that this PDF serves as a comprehensive guideline for the application and nomination process for the China Electrical Engineering Society Science and Technology Award. It outlines the necessary documentation, structure, and specific requirements for submitting a project, including details on technological innovations, evaluations, application promotion, and economic and social benefits.
The decoy also mentions some interesting guidelines for the current project for nomination, in case it has received other awards too.
The document concludes with guidelines for researchers on submitting essential documents that validate the legitimacy and credibility of their research. This includes items such as Peer Expert Recommendation Letters, photographs, and other relevant information, including specifications for video format and additional submission guidelines. Now, let us look into the other decoy document.
Looking into the decoy-document – II
The second document, titled 附件2：《中国电工技术学会科学技术奖励办法》（2024年4月修订）.pdf translates to “Attachment 2: Regulations on Scientific and Technological Awards of the China Electrotechnical Society (Revised April 2024),” it is clear that it is closely related to the same theme as the first document. This document also focuses on the purpose of the award ceremony, detailing various awards and emphasizing the overall societal improvement and growth achieved through these award ceremonies.
The decoy mentions various awards like the Technology Invention Award, Scientific & Technological Progress Award, and the various criteria like someone building a Major Engineering Project and much more, it also mentions about other award known as Gaojingde Scientific and Technological Achievement Award which aims to inspire and encourage contributions to the Electrical Engineering field.
The document concludes with adhering guidelines on revocation of awards, in case it is found that any improper means have been used to obtain the award, well the last thing which is mentioned in this decoy is about various regulations maintained by Chinese Electrical Engineering Society and they are responsible for the interpretation of the regulations. Overall, this lure document serves as a guideline for the entire process of evaluation, types of awards, and much more under transparency in recognizing the achievements in the electrical engineering domain.
Technical Analysis
We will divide our analysis into two main sections. First, we will examine the malicious LNK and VBScript components utilized by the threat actor across the campaigns. Second, we will delve into the malicious Cobalt Strike implant and extract its configuration details.
Our research has uncovered more than 18 distinct infection chains linked to this threat actor. In this blog, we will focus specifically on one of these campaigns that targets electrotechnical researchers in Hong Kong. This detailed exploration will shed light on the methodologies employed and provide insights into the threat actor’s tactics within this particular campaign.
Stage 1 – Malicious LNK Script & VBScript
The RAR contains an LNK known as 附件1：《2024年度中国电工技术学会科学技术奖推荐提名书》（技术发明奖和科技进步奖）填报说明(2024年8月新版).pdf.lnk , upon exploring the it became quite evident that the sole purpose of the LNK is just to run the malicious VBScript O365.vbs using a Windows Utility known as wscript.exe .
Upon analyzing the malicious VBScript, we found the following.
① The initial part of the script mimics a utility for managing and generating compressed cabinets from an MSI database, which can be useful for software distribution and installation processes.
② Next, there is a variable known as ElZn , which contains the encoded contents, which further on decoding turns out of another VBScript.
③ The decoded VBScript renames the backup cache.bak found in the RAR which was delivered to the target to sigverif.exe and moves subscription.db to a specified destination based on the decoded name. It copies the sigverif.exe to a temporary folder and then deletes the original to remove its presence. The script executes both the renamed executable and the copied version in the temporary folder, indicating an intention to perform actions silently in the background. Additionally, it creates a scheduled task named WpnUserService_x64 to run sigverif.exe every 59 minutes. Finally, the script deletes itself after execution.
④ Finally, post execution of this VBScript, which performs the persistence, there is some additional garbage code which is completely irrelevant.
Now, in this section it is clearly evident that this LNK which is responsible for running the VBScript, which was rename the Cobalt Strike Implant and further create a scheduled task. We will look into the Cobalt Strike Beacon in the next section.
Stage 2 – Malicious Cobalt Strike Beacon.
Upon analysis, we found that the cache.bak which was basically renamed as SigVerifier.exe , turns out to be a 32-bit executable.
Now, upon analyzing the binary, we found that this is basically a Cobalt Strike Beacon which is trying to connect to the C2 server. As, there are various research on fundamentals of Cobalt Strike implant, we will not touch into the concepts like Jitter, C2 Uri and other fundamentals. Next, we went ahead and extracted the configurations.
The beacon configuration extracted from the implant are as follows:
Extracted Beacon Configuration:
BeaconType : HTTPS
Therefore, above is the extracted configuration from the malicious Cobalt Strike Beacon, next we will look into hunting similar samples and look into similar infrastructure hosted by the threat actor.
Hunting and Infrastructure
In this section, we will discuss how we uncovered additional campaigns by leveraging a simple artifact: the threat actor’s consistent use of the name ImeBroker.exe for different Cobalt Strike implants across all campaigns. Originally, ImeBroker.exe is a legitimate Windows utility related to language input, specifically managing Input Method Editors (IME) that allow users to type in languages with complex scripts.
While reverse-engineering the implant, we discovered a suspicious code segment. Using this segment we identified a total of 14 samples with similar names and identical binary sizes, all deployed by the threat actor as Cobalt Strike beacons with compilation timestamp “Compilation Timestamp: 2015-07-10 03:27:31“ and delivered via different lures. Additionally, going by configurations, we found 21 more Cobalt Strike beacons with similar configurations. This pattern highlights the threat actor’s widespread use of consistent naming and configurations across multiple campaigns.
Another artefact, we used while hunting this threat actor was machine IDs present in multiple LNKs, which were common across campaigns targeting Hong Kong & Islamabad. The ID laptop-g5qalv96 triggers cscript.exe unlike the others that uses wscript.exe to execute the VBS. Based on this ID, two campaigns with Pakistan-based lures have been found.
Another related ID desktop-727otfd triggers explorer.exe to open “PressMe.pdf” which is found in multiple archive files of this campaign. An interesting file path is present as well: “C:\LLVM\bin\LnkFishing\.asset\.asset.pdf“.
We, will look into some set of interesting campaigns and their decoys linked to the Cobalt Strike beacons, that we have found.
Campaign 1: Targeting Defense industry.
We found this lure along with one of the Cobalt Strike beacons, which seems to be an evaluation of a research paper focusing on proposed theoretical framework in military operations.
Campaign 2: Targeting Electro-technical Researchers.
We found another lure which discusses about critics on a research paper, which focuses on modeling and simulation of a power generation system, mentioning Ebsilon software and CFETR [China Fusion Engineering Test Reactor].
Campaign 3: Targeting Electronic Engineering Education Industry.
Well, upon extracting a RAR based on our hunting known as 博士后申请-王玉玺-华中科技大学-电气与电子工程-博士 which translates to Postdoctoral Application – Wang Yuxi – Huazhong University of Science and Technology – Electrical and Electronic Engineering – PhD in English, we found that the threat actor had been targeting the victim by using lures of postdoctoral application pro s of individuals.
Campaign 4: Targeting Defense Industry of Pakistan.
Upon looking into this lure, we found out that the lure is basically targeting Pakistani Defense Industry, the lure contains data on information about the upcoming exhibition in Pakistan in November 2024.
Other interesting campaigns
We also found these interesting lures from campaigns targeting Pakistani Military Academy & Chinese Cybersecurity Researchers mimicking CNCERT, well last but not the least, we also found that the threat actor also targets medical institutes based out of China.
Based on the beacons of all these similar implants, we found most of this samples connect to the similar Command & Control server with exactly the same ASN5090 registered with Tencent as shown below:
| IP | ASN | Geolocation |
| 139.155.190..84 | AS45090 (Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited) | China
|
| 43.137.69.76 | ||
| 139.155.190.198 | ||
| 106.55.77.71 | ||
| 129.204.98.221 | ||
| 119.45.2.30 | ||
| 119.45.67.241 | ||
| 119.45.2.56 |
A huge set of host headers have been identified that are linked to Tencent (*tencentapigw.com or *tencentcs.com), of which few are:
Conclusion
A new threat actor campaign has been uncovered that primarily focuses on the Defence and research sectors in South Asian nations, particularly targeting Pakistan and Hong Kong, with an increasing interest in India. Our analysis indicates a significant focus on engineering researchers, professors, and key entities in Hong Kong, Mainland China, and Pakistan. Leveraging sophisticated lures—such as decoy documents related to electrotechnical societies, energy infrastructure, civil aviation, and environmental engineering—this campaign strategically targets professionals in technical fields. The actor heavily relies on the post-exploitation tool Cobalt Strike to execute their operations, suggesting a methodical approach to cyber-espionage.
Based on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed in the campaign, including the consistent use of malicious LNKs, VBScript, and Cobalt Strike payloads, we can conclude that this threat actor has specifically targeted this group of victims since May 2024 based on timestamps. The scope and complexity of the campaign, coupled with the tailored lures, strongly suggest a targeted effort by an APT group to compromise sensitive research and intellectual property in these industries.
It is recommended to take necessary precautions to stay protected – don’t click any unknown links or download suspicious attachments, update your anti-virus solutions and software systems, backup your data regularly and enable multi-factor authentication.
SEQRITE Protection
- Whisper.49086.GC
- Whisper.49085
- CobaltStrike
IOCs
Archive
| MD5 | Filename |
| 86543a984e604430fb7685a1e707b2c4 | 科学技术奖填报说明和奖励办法修订版.rar |
| 95557088474250a9749b958c3935dee4 | 最新停车场收费标准调整方案.rar |
| 95f05674e4cb18a363346b488b67fd38 | ╒δ╢╘í╢│Θ╦«╨ε─▄╡τ╒╛╩Σ╦«╖ó╡τ╧╡═│╖╜░╕╔Φ╝╞▒╚╤í╤╨╛┐í╖╡─╨▐╕─╜¿╥Θ.zip |
| b8c94d2f66481cc52b30948f65fed761 | ╣π╕µ═╢╖┼╥¬╟≤╩Θ.zip |
| 4cf9bd6af64c3937e156ffb20537a6c1 | 预加油航班管理方法研究与软件实现（修改意见）.rar |
| b2649134fbf0520222263d73b7e985d8 | aaa.zip |
| af669dfa074eb9b6fda3fd258f58e2d2 | 贾哲文-云南大学-环境工程.rar |
| 865483fea76242e687aa9e76b1a37f28 | 刘潇-清华大学-计算机.rar |
| 432230af1d59dac7dfb47e0684807240 | 李新宇-北京大学-2026毕业-金融硕士.rar |
| b9d04a61b30ddf53b28bf58a86fc28f5 | 热核聚变发电岛三回路参数优化研究（修改意见）.rar |
| 2d478e4527486d85932254c7a7413951 | 国家互联网应急中心CCSC认证邀请函_海关信息中心.rar |
| e08dcbbd3e2ab9bcc2c02c44b6a97870 | 异构平台要素协同理论方法研究(修改意见).rar |
| fe4c575abf70ad11cdbce0b0821ee681 | 博士后申请-王玉玺-华中科技大学-电气与电子工程-博士.rar |
| 68278e47f36a44d9a8bbd46b74422bbe | 企业资质材料.zip |
| 58f5ff5be4e765e62758b1f3e679a2ac | 针对《苍术倍半萜类化合物生物合成的研究进展》的修改建议.rar |
| 955841a4d2315422818b47aec6ce51fb | 中债数据无法使用情况.rar |
| 75def3a25b1d355c9163d3c247990867 | 参编《人工智能通用大模型合规管理体系 指南》申请表.rar |
| 343a3944218a040089fa7131112c1681 | 中国外汇交易中心信息产品许可表.rar |
| b28bb7cabfb12e9bc5b87692b065c83a | Islamabad_Security_Dialogue_Pub.rar |
| 7728fee377137e83e9bd1c609cc166c0 | IDEAS_2024_Calling_Letter.zip |
| dad7d9528e9506ebd0524b3ebd89ddf2 | Final_Combined_Forecast_MCP_FY_2024_25.zip |
LNK
| MD5 | Filename |
| 22c07c76020f9311385cfaa97a2d6adb | 附件1：《2024年度中国电工技术学会科学技术奖推荐提名书》（技术发明奖和科技进步奖）填报说明(2024年8月新版).pdf.lnk |
| 7a494f7448bc350bb46fb7f21450d1d9 | 最新停车场收费标准调整方案.lnk |
| 3c3986899bdb4890ea6d44c00538e2fd | ╒δ╢╘í╢│Θ╦«╨ε─▄╡τ╒╛╩Σ╦«╖ó╡τ╧╡═│╖╜░╕╔Φ╝╞▒╚╤í╤╨╛┐í╖╡─╨▐╕─╜¿╥Θ.docx.lnk |
| 74ca14032a93be59098d607ba7039660 | 预加油航班管理方法研究与软件实现（修改意见）.docx.lnk |
| cd14d51d27f294c2e60d1bc3ef907160 | 电影宣传要求.pdf.lnk |
| db08274efb374e2196a9f46961c8d8f8 | 需使用中债数据.jpg.lnk |
| 62eb90df5ee3a3b443c277d12b893141 | 贾哲文-云南大学-环境工程.docx.lnk |
| 41b5d5a04cf4534550e6ac3fc9a8f42d | 刘潇-清华大学-计算机科学与技术学院-硕士.pdf.lnk |
| ae55cb4988f2f45197132631f5a86632 | filename.lnk |
| 5ae488083403cd69002c29ef6326cca7 | 李新宇-北京大学-2026毕业-金融硕士.pdf.lnk |
| 72011305317d7e9d38a0e75650f22e34 | 修改建议.docx.lnk |
| d73a5c11423923d8a8c483cf6172f7e2 | <NA> |
| 473adee7068573fd01862b4bf43979e6 | Islamabad_Security_Dialogue_Pub.pdf.lnk |
| a02a664f80d9011e38c45762683771c0 | Final_Combined_Forecast_MCP_FY_2024_25.pdf.lnk
12th_Edition_Of_Innovation_&_Excellence_IDEAS_2024.pdf.lnk |
| 10d0a351df1bfe57494ac18a7f2edec1 | 热核聚变发电岛三回路参数优化研究（修改意见）.docx.lnk |
| 10d6fb6ab395001a4424058a52c3c69f | 国家互联网应急中心CCSC认证邀请函_海关信息中心.pdf.lnk |
| 1070fc4a998cb7515842fb1b647340be | 异构平台要素协同理论方法研究(修改意见).docx.lnk |
| 1b538fef54102fd36e83e4fc549f960e | 博士后申请-王玉玺-华中科技大学-电气与电子工程博士-简历.pdf.lnk |
| c8231c5709ca548f1fe70f3b61d3537a | 针对《苍术倍半萜类化合物生物合成的研究进展》的修改建议.docx.lnk |
| 955a8b63723eb35686ddce6cbfe890cf | 中债数据无法使用情况.jpg.lnk |
| da623c5ca61e25c6205904a5cb91bd55 | 参编《人工智能通用大模型合规管理体系 指南》申请表.pdf.lnk |
| afc805006390b00713898c09d50343b6 | 中国外汇交易中心信息产品许可表.doc.lnk |
VBS
| MD5 | Filename |
| 0a34cc8983fb581a59308135868b75d0 | O365.vbs |
| 5d18995193465c618844949f0ff9c786 | cache.vbs |
| 4c409d7201ec5dccf55a8ea54b0de101 | DS_Store.vbs |
| 39ab2053406493b9a0d81ed40212ffa8 | O365.vbs |
| 4711d0d163c00158abd4b20177d68b9a | DS_Store.vbs |
| 3dce8d8f9664c755448413cbfe1bc08f | DS_Store.vbs |
| 3b573c2229b43bde50f998f6cba17f2f | DS_Store.vbs |
| 318a1a18df75b49f72fbcc020384cc24 | DS_Store.vbs |
| a0d760492c0193d14114792f0c3fff7a | cache.vbs |
| cafdc03dcbe06ac43ec25fb38c1e013f | cache.vbs |
| d13828ae89a7dab34d2f380eef518332 | cache.vbs |
| 7e98bb7ffba4cf12d29132a2c71973eb | cache.vbs |
| c3d460ac3a93e86782c2bc374aa5ecd2 | Anx.vbs |
| 93eafad827126a9d12fc1d0e6e21aaef | cal.vbs |
| a4a47dd08cf59f8b6a7c907cf0e39029 | cal.vbs |
| b2c882f6121d758cfcd4ece31834f497 | O365.vbs |
| 86e4c5d39dda20eee4dd8f794be04c80 | DS_Store.vbs |
| e7f3c33a5cd569ebf4b57381f03c5337 | cache.vbs |
| 7ac5daaa5fe4e59137271eaf97c9e692 | O365.vbs |
| a2f64bafeafbeb303d24fd6ed1f5a89a | DS_Store.vbs |
| 8ba5b61454a29e09e7f536e85c951f53 | DS_Store.vbs |
| 4eeeb2b40e7189c271098c515b8f91d8 | DS_Store.vbs |
| 3711e1913f2ae74c4fc765bc28dbc60f | DS_Store.vbs |
| e112698125e67a1a6f26597371cae502 | DS_Store.vbs |
| 67dc90468327a0c733ca48881084593b | cache.vbs |
| d68fb3502e63ef3ca91c45f508d146b9 | cache.vbs |
| 91b7328a6064706fa9f125621a09f648 | cache.vbs |
| bfd61e5e133b2cd592d42ecdbc0eaee2 | cache.vbs |
| e5e709be4584031aefdc2a0782017f8f | cache.vbs |
| cf59916d271dce7f44bbf349464a31e2 | cache.vbs |
| 5d18995193465c618844949f0ff9c786 | cache.vbs |
| e213dc8060794bb97c5f94f563107e88 | cache.vbs |
| d01e7c41140aeff82ad87a558ae96587 | DS_Store.vbs |
| de3a0ff11c7645f5d0ac717b0eb98e52 | cache.vbs |
Cobalt Strike (EXE)
| MD5 | Filename |
| d29980f768aafdcf102cf1b3741c8a2b | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 2acfad6fd814b02683038d21ba3eccbe | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 1aa1f12d26d3a34265d0b99705bdf283 | DevicesFlow.EXE / DS_Store |
| e7550dd2db4dbe1a2cc1dadc47846cd0 | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 1d109c8bb9e6ad16cd5f6813db39c21a | Microsoft IME / DS_Store |
| d8c348a2f27097d8689dba4452bb76eb | charmap.exe / DS_Store |
| 14df06539b72837adb9f8d13cfcea6db | CTTUNE.EXE / DS_Store |
| 6388625810652f0767be13b43363c10d | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| e8d3540212384d45ba9d7135c5bf8d8e | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 352e299fc3f2327bfad5026b4a56b7cb | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 73fa6149e68dd7842f7cfce78dd732c5 | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak / sigverif.exe |
| 3813e4ebddd87615c1adc9c05888341d | 企业资质材料/企业签名解密专用解密工具.exe D:\MyPrograms\vs2022\vt01\vt\x64\Release\vt.pdb |
| 316e8d798f7db625c207532e2f7a5d38 | keycongif.exe / Anx |
| 5e7dba4aafb8176ab026e2f4aa3211dd | Adobbee.exe / cal |
| 33b3e322679f1500a9f3c162e4b25040 | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 2694553347f23e250ed70a8c23096d8f | BioEnrollmentHost.exe / DS_Store |
| 800be8a4989d4b7ed07ddd068c6469f1 | DevicesFlow.EXE / DS_Store |
| bfd6c2f0787865ecb1604439ea9a5f15 | imecfmui.exe / cache.bak |
| 49c5553995f032195890b5bfc2abcb00 | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| ae9d676e4eda5cfa18a061e4bc2b1637 | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 008255c14420420e9a53c9959d0d08b8 | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 49a9c56fab34795b7e6e4c0b6185ca3e | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| d901fa81a4b3d83219440b80a1c338bc | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak |
| 88b8bbe04b53e4af857cd1c032968c94 | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak / sigverif.exe |
| 1d065492e7b5d118e31e571cc53dfe65 | ImeBroker.exe / cache.bak / sigverif.exe |
Decoys
| MD5 | Filename |
| 98b85b474c02ce8c0a33ad7507abbf2a | subscription.db |
| 5368f0b6ff56cce0de42165f14067427 | 附件2：《中国电工技术学会科学技术奖励办法》（2024年4月修订）.pdf |
| 22ce60653860fe33bdfc47ce60deb681 | │Θ╦«╨ε─▄╡τ╒╛╩Σ╦«╖ó╡τ╧╡═│╖╜░╕╔Φ╝╞▒╚╤í╤╨╛┐_╦╬╫╙╞µ.pdf |
| b69c075caff565528bf42705d936a066 | cache.db |
| 477c5abea7299891b7f7c487f8636613 | ╡τ╙░╨√┤½╥¬╟≤.pdf / 电影宣传要求.pdf |
| 298a27e24e4ca917020fa5a230fe6c8f | subscription.db |
| 820485d456ce6bfab933a1b662ff590a | 贾哲文-云南大学-环境工程.docx |
| 55467fcb1b51477104442e74d7baf3df | cache.db |
| ab1bc05e7f110042d7eacda5724918e0 | cache.db |
| 8423873a0eee6139c1eb6d5a9919121b | 企业资质证明（请先解密）.pptx |
| 6833e934c675717a0581472e00cb6d93 | 12th_Edition_Of_Innovation_&_Excellence_IDEAS_2024.pdf |
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MITRE ATT&CK
| Tactic | Technique ID | Name |
| Initial Access | T1566.001 | Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment |
| Execution | T1204.002
T1059.005 |
User Execution: Malicious File
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
| Persistence | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task |
| Defense Evasion | T1055.002 | Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection |
| Discovery | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
| Command and Control | T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
Authors
- Sathwik Ram Prakki
- Subhajeet Singha
