In the recent past, cyberattacks on Indian government entities by Pakistan-linked APTs have gained significant momentum. Seqrite Labs APT team has discovered multiple such campaigns during telemetry analysis and hunting in the wild. One such threat group, SideCopy, has deployed its commonly used AllaKore RAT in three separate campaigns over the last few weeks, where two such RATs were deployed at a time in each campaign. During the same events, its parent APT group Transparent Tribe (APT36) continuously used Crimson RAT but with either an encoded or a packed version. Based on their C2 infrastructure, we were able to correlate these APTs, proving their sub-divisional relation once again. This blog overviews these campaigns and how a connection is established by looking at their previous attacks.
India is one of the most targeted countries in the cyber threat landscape where not only Pakistan-linked APT groups like SideCopy and APT36 (Transparent Tribe) have targeted India but also new spear-phishing campaigns such as Operation RusticWeb and FlightNight have emerged. At the same time, we have observed an increase in the sale of access to Indian entities (both government and corporate) by initial access brokers in the underground forums, high-profile ransomware attacks, and more than 2900 disruptive attacks such as DDoS, website defacement and database leaks by 85+ Telegram Hacktivist groups in the first quarter of 2024.
Threat Actor Profile
SideCopy is a Pakistan-linked Advanced Persistent Threat group that has been targeting South Asian countries, primarily the Indian defense and government entities, since at least 2019. Its arsenal includes Ares RAT, Action RAT, AllaKore RAT, Reverse RAT, Margulas RAT and more. Transparent Tribe (APT36), its parent threat group with the same persistent targeting, shares code similarity and constantly updates its Linux malware arsenal. Active since 2013, it has continuously used payloads such as Crimson RAT, Capra RAT, Eliza RAT and Oblique RAT in its campaigns.
SideCopy
So far, three attack campaigns with the same infection chain have been observed, using compromised domains to host payloads. Instead of side-loading the Action RAT (DUser.dll) payload, as seen previously, two custom variants of an open-source remote agent called AllaKore are deployed as the final payload.
Fig. 1 – Attack Chain of SideCopy
Infection Process
- Spear-phishing starts with an archive file containing a shortcut (LNK) in a double-extension format.
- Opening the LNK triggers the MSHTA process, which executes a remote HTA file hosted on a compromised domain. The stage-1 HTA contains two embedded files, a decoy and a DLL, that are base64 encoded.
- DLL is triggered to run in-memory where the decoy file is dropped & opened by it. As previously seen, the DLL creates multiple text files that mention the name “Mahesh Chand” and various other random texts.
- Later, the DLL will download two HTA files from the same compromised domain to begin its second stage process.
- Both the HTA contain embedded files, this time an EXE and two DLLs.
- One of the DLLs is executed in-memory, which drops the remaining two files into the public directory after decoding them. Persistence on the final payload is set beforehand via the Run registry key. One example:
REG ADD “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” /V “issas” /t REG_SZ /F /D “C:\Users\Public\issas\issas.exe”
Fig. 2 – Files dropped in one of the campaigns
- Lastly, both the final payloads, which is AllaKore RAT, are executed and connected with the same IP but different port numbers for C2 communication. The final DLL is not side-loaded but is completely legitimate and old file.
An in-depth analysis of each stage can be checked in our previous blogs and whitepapers. It contains timers for timeout, reconnection, clipboard, and separate sockets for desktop, files, and keyboard. The functionality of AllaKore includes:
- Gathering system information
- Enumerating files and folders
- Upload and execute files
- Keylogging
- Steal clipboard data
The Delphi-based AllaKore RATs have the following details campaign-wise:
| Campaign | Internal Name | Compiler Timestamp |
| 1 | msmediaGPview
msmediarenderapp |
06-Mar-2024 |
| 2 | msvideolib
msrenderapp |
18-Mar-2024 |
| 3 | msvideolib
msrenderapp |
01-Apr-2024 |
Initially, the RAT sends and receives ping-pong commands, listening to the C2 for commands to know that the connection is alive. Both RAT payloads run together, complementing each other, as seen in the network traffic below. Their sizes are also different: one is 3.2 MB, and the other almost doubles to 7 MB, like Double Action RAT. A connection ID based on the system information is created for each instance.
Fig. 3 – Network traffic for port 9828
Fig. 4 – Network traffic for port 6663
List of encrypted strings used for C2 communication in smaller-sized payloads:
| Encrypted | Decrypted |
| 7oYGAVUv7QVqOT0iUNI | SocketMain |
| 7oYBFJGQ | OK |
| 7o4AfMyIMmN | Info |
| 7ooG0ewSx5K | PING |
| 7ooGyOueQVE | PONG |
| 7oYCkQ4hb550 | Close |
| 7oIBPsa66QyecyD | NOSenha |
| 7oIDcXX6y8njAD | Folder |
| 7oIDaDhgXCBA | Files |
| 7ooD/IcBeHXEooEVVuH4BB | DownloadFile |
| 7o4H11u36Kir3n4M4NM | UploadFile |
| Sx+WZ+QNgX+TgltTwOyU4D | Unknown (Windows) |
| QxI/Ngbex4qIoVZBMB | Windows Vista |
| QxI/Ngbex46Q | Windows 7 |
| QxI/Ngbex4aRKA | Windows 10 |
| QxI/Ngbex4KTxLImkWK | Windows 8.1/10 |
Various file operations have been incorporated, including create, delete, execute, copy, move, rename, zip, and upload, which are part of the AllaKore agent. These commands were found in the bigger payload.
Fig. 5 – File move operation
Fig. 6 – Commands in the second payload
The DLL files dropped are not sideloaded by the AllaKore RAT, and they are legitimate files that could be later used for malicious purposes. These are Microsoft Windows-related libraries, but only a few contain a valid signature.
| Dropped DLL Name |
PDB |
Description |
Compilation Timestamp |
| msdr.dll | Windows.Management.Workplace.WorkplaceSettings.pdb | Windows Runtime WorkplaceSettings DLL | 2071-08-19 |
| braveservice.dll | dbghelp.pdb | Windows Image Helper | 2052-02-25 |
| salso.dll | D3d12core.pdb | Direct3D 12 Core Runtime | 1981-03-18 |
| salso.dll | OrtcEngine.pdb | Microsoft Skype ORTC Engine | 2020-01-07 |
| salso.dll | msvcp120d.amd64.pdb | Microsoft® C Runtime Library | 2013-10-05 |
| FI_Ejec13234.dll | IsAppRun.pdb | TODO:<> | 2013-10-15 |
Decoys
Two decoy files have been observed, where one was used in previous campaigns in February-March 2023. The date in the document, “21 December 2022,” has been removed, and the bait’s name has been changed to indicate March 2024 – “Grant_of_Risk_and_HardShip_Allowances_Mar_24.pdf.” As the name suggests, it is an advisory from 2022 on allowance grants to Army officers under India’s Ministry of Defence. This is used in two of the three campaigns.
Fig. 7 – Decoy (1)
The second decoy is related to the same allowance category and mentions payment in arrears form. This is another old document used previously, dated 19 January 2023.
Fig. 8 – Decoy (2)
Infrastructure and Attribution
The compromised domains resolve to the same IP addresses used in previous campaigns, as seen with the passive DNS replication since last year.
| IP | Compromised Domain | Campaign |
| 151.106.97[.]183 | inniaromas[.]com
ivinfotech[.]com |
November 2023
|
| revivelife.in | March 2024 | |
| vparking[.]online | April 2024 | |
| 162.241.85[.]104 | ssynergy[.]in | April 2023 |
| elfinindia[.]com | May 2023 | |
| occoman[.]com | August 2023 | |
| sunfireglobal[.]in | October 2023 | |
| masterrealtors[.]in | November 2023 | |
| smokeworld[.]in | March 2024 |
C2 servers of AllaKore RAT are registered in Germany to AS51167 – Contabo GmbH, commonly used by SideCopy. Based on the attack chain and arsenal used, these campaigns are attributed to SideCopy, which has high confidence and uses similar infrastructure to carry out the infection.
| 164.68.102[.]44 | vmi1701584.contaboserver.net |
| 213.136.94[.]11 | vmi1761221.contaboserver.net |
The following chart depicts telemetry hits observed for all three SideCopy campaigns related to AllaKore RAT. The first two campaigns indicate a spike twice in March, whereas the third campaign is observed during the second week of April.
Fig. 9 – SideCopy campaign hits
Transparent Tribe
Many Crimson RAT samples are seen regularly on the VirusTotal platform, with a detection rate of around 40-50. In our threat hunting, we have found new samples but have had very few detections.
Fig. 10 – Infection Chain of APT36
Analyzing the infection chain to observe any changes, we found that the Crimson RAT samples are not embedded directly into the maldocs as they usually are. This time, the maldoc in the XLAM form contained three objects: the decoy and base64-encoded blobs.
Fig. 11 – Additional Functions in Macro
After extracting the VBA macro, we see additional functions for reading a file, decoding base64, and converting binary to string. The macro reads and decodes the two base64 blobs embedded inside the maldoc. This contains archived Crimson RAT executed samples, after which the decoy file is opened.
Fig. 12 – VBA infection flow
Crimson RAT
The final RAT payloads contain the same functionality where 22 commands for C2 communication are used. As the detection rate is typically high for this Crimson RAT, we see a low rate for both these samples. These .NET samples have compilation timestamp of 2024-03-17 and PDB as:
“C:\New folder\mulhiar tarsnib\mulhiar tarsnib\obj\Debug\mulhiar tarsnib.pdb”
Fig. 13 – Detection count on VT
No major changes were observed when the C2 commands were checked along with the process flow. IP of the C2 is 204.44.124[.]134, which tries to check the connection with 5 different ports – 9149, 15597, 18518, 26791, 28329. Below, you can find C2 commands for some of the recent samples (compile-timestamp-wise) of Crimson RAT, which uses similar 22 to 24 commands. All of these are not packed (except the last two) and have the same size range of 10-20 MB.
Fig. 14 – C2 commands of Crimson RAT for recent samples
As seen in BinDiff, similarity with previous samples is always more than 75%. Changes in the order of the command interpreted by the RAT were only found with numerical addition or splitting the command in two.
Fig. 15 – Comparing similarity between Crimson RAT variants
Additionally, two new samples that were obfuscated with Eziriz’s .NET Reactor were also found which are named ‘ShareX’ and ‘Analytics Based Card.’ APT36 has used different packers and obfuscators like ConfuserEx, Crypto Obfusator, and Eazfuscator, in the past. Compared with the previous iteration, the regular ones contain 22-24 commands as usual, whereas the obfuscated one contains 40 commands. The C2, in this case, is juichangchi[.]online trying to connect with four ports – 909, 67, 65, 121. A few of these C2 commands don’t have functionality yet, but they are similar to the ones first documented by Proofpoint. The list of all 22 commands and their functionality can be found in our previous whitepaper on APT36.
Fig. 16 – Comparison after deobufscation
Decoys
The maldoc named “Imp message from dgms” contains DGMS, which stands for India’s Directorate General of Mines Safety. The decoy document contains various points relating to land and urban policies associated with military or defense, showing its intended targeting of the Indian Government. Another maldoc named “All details” is empty but has a heading called posting list.
Fig. 17 – DGMS decoy
Crimson Keylogger
A malicious .NET file with a similar PDB naming convention to Crimson RAT was recently seen, with a compilation timestamp of 2023-06-14. Analysis led to a keylogger payload that captures all keyboard activity.
- PDB: e:\vdhrh madtvin\vdhrh madtvin\obj\Debug\vdhrh madtvin.pdb
Apart from capturing each keystroke and writing it into a file, it collects the name of the current process in the foreground. Toggle keys are captured separately and based on key combinations; clipboard data is also copied to the storage file.
Fig. 18 – Crimson Keylogger
Correlation
Similar to the code overlaps seen previously between SideCopy and APT36 in Linux-based payloads, based on the domain used as C2 by Transparent Tribe, we pivot to see passive DNS replications of the domain using Virus Total and Validin. The C2 for the above two packed samples resolved to different IPs – 176.107.182[.]55 and 162.245.191[.]214, as seen in the below timeline, giving us when they went live.
Fig. 19 – Timeline of C2 domain
This also leads us to two additional IP addresses: 155.94.209[.]4 and 162.255.119[.]207. The first one is communicating with a payload having detections of only 7/73 on Virus Total, whereas the latter is not associated with new malware. The malware seems to be another .NET Reactor packed payload with compile timestamp as 2039-02-24 but small (6.55 MB) compared to the Crimson RAT payloads.
Fig. 20 – Deobufscated AllaKore RAT
The default name of the sample is an Indian language word “Kuchbhi.pdb” meaning anything. After deobfuscation, we see C2 commands that are similar to the above Delphi-based AllaKore RAT deployed by SideCopy. Only this time it is in a .NET variant with the following five commands:
| C2 Command | Function |
| LIST_DRIVES | Retrieve and send list of drives on the machine |
| LIST_FILES | Enumerate files and folder in the given path |
| UPLOAD_FILE | Download and execute file |
| PING | Listening to C2 and send PONG for live status |
| getinfo | Send username, machine name and OS information |
Persistence is set in two ways, run registry key or through the startup directory.
Overlap of code usability was found in SideCopy’s Linux-based stager payload of Ares RAT and that of Transparent Tribe’s Linux-based python malware called Poseidon and other desktop utilities. Here we see similar code overlaps and possibly sharing of C2 infrastructure between the two groups. AllaKore RAT (open source) has been associated with SideCopy since its discovery in 2019 along with Action RAT payload. Similarly, Crimson RAT is linked to be an in-house toolset of APT36.
Infrastructure and Attribution
Looking at the C2, the same target names used previously by APT36 were identified that are running Windows Server 2012 and 2022 versions.
| IP | ASN | Organization | Country | Name |
| 204.44.124[.]134 | AS8100 | QuadraNet Inc | United States | WIN-P9NRMH5G6M8 |
| 162.245.191[.]214 | AS8100 | QuadraNet Inc | United States | WIN-P9NRMH5G6M8 |
| 155.94.209[.]4 | AS207083 | Quadranet Inc | Netherlands | WIN-P9NRMH5G6M8 |
| 176.107.182[.]55 | AS47987 | Zemlyaniy Dmitro Leonidovich | Ukraine | WIN-9YM6J4IRPC |
Based on this correlation and previous attack chains, these campaigns are attributed to both APT36 and SideCopy groups with high confidence, establishing yet another strong connection between them.
Conclusion
Persistent targeting of the Indian government and defense entities by Pakistan-linked APT groups has continued, where new operations have emerged with similar threats. SideCopy has deployed its well—associated AllaKore RAT in multiple campaigns, whereas its parent group, Transparent Tribe (APT36), is continuously using Crimson RAT, T, making changes to evade detections.
As the threat landscape shifts due to various geopolitical events like the Israel-Iran conflict, India is bound to get targeted continuously. On the verge of India’s upcoming election, it is suggested that necessary precautions be taken and that people stay protected amidst the increasing cybercrime.
Seqrite Protection
- SideCopy.48519
- SideCopy.48674.GC
- Trojan.48761.GC
- SideCopy.S30112905
- SideCopy
- Downloader.48760.GC
- Crimson
IOCs
SideCopy
| HTA | |
| 6cdc79655e9866e31f6c901d0a05401d | jfhdsjfh34frjkfs23432.hta |
| dbf196ccb2fe4b6fb01f93a603056e55 | flutter.hta |
| 37b10e4ac08534ec36a59be0009a63b4 | plugins.hta |
| d907284734ea5bf3bd277e118b6c51f0 | bjihfsdfhdjsh234234.hta |
| 2a47ea398397730681f121f13efd796f | plugins.hta |
| 6ab0466858eb6d71d830e7b2e86dab03 | flutter.hta |
| ecc65e6074464706bb2463cb74f576f7 | 4358437iufgdshvjy5843765.hta |
| da529e7b6056a055e3bbbace20740ee9 | min-js.hta |
| cadafc6a91fc4bba33230baed9a8a338 | nodejsmin.hta |
| Embedded DLL | |
| 1e5285ee087c0d73c76fd5b0b7bc787c | hta.dll |
| f74c59fd5b835bf7630fbf885d6a21aa | hta.dll |
| 3cc6602a1f8a65b5c5e855df711edeb0 | hta.dll |
| 990bfd8bf27be13cca9fa1fa07a28350 | SummitOfBion.dll |
| 29fa44d559b4661218669aa958851a59 | SummitOfBion.dll |
| 26bde2d6a60bfc6ae472c0e9c8d976e2 | SummitOfBion.dll |
| eceb986d166526499f8f37fd3efd44db | SummitOfBion.dll |
| 2a680cf1e54f1a1f585496e14d34c7e9 | SummitOfBion.dll |
| AllaKore RAT | |
| 76ca50a71e014aa2d089fed1251bf6cd | issas.exe |
| 71b285c8903bb38d16d97c1042cbeb92 | quick.exe |
| 9684bf8955b348540446df6b78813cdb | cove.exe |
| 48e1e695258a23742cd27586e262c55a | salso.exe |
| 4ba7ca56d1a6082f0303f2041b0c1a45 | cove.exe |
| 6cda3b5940a2a97c5e71efcd1dd1d2ca | FI_Ejec1.exe |
| Decoys | |
| 30796f8fb6a8ddc4432414be84b8a489
8740d186877598297e714fdf3ab507e9 |
Grant_of_Risk_and_HardShip_Allowances_Mar_24.pdf |
| DLL | |
| abeaa649bd3d8b9e04a3678b86d13b6b | msdr.dll |
| b3a5e819e3cf9834a6b33c606fc50289 | braveservice.dll |
| 312923e0baf9796a846e5aad0a4d0fb6 | salso.dll |
| 1d7fc8a9241de652e481776e99aa3d46 | salso.dll |
| 760ff1f0496e78d37c77b2dc38bcbbe4 | salso.dll |
| fa5a94f04e684d30ebdc4bf829d9c604 | FI_Ejec13234.dll |
| Compromised Domains | |
| revivelife[.]in | 151.106.97[.]183 |
| smokeworld[.]in | 162.241.85[.]104 |
| vparking[.]online | 151.106.97[.]183 |
| C2 and Ports | |
| 164.68.102[.]44 | 6663, 9828 |
| 213.136.94[.]11 | 6663, 7880 |
| URLs | |
| hxxps://revivelife[.]in/assets/js/other/new/ | |
| hxxps://revivelife[.]in/assets/js/other/new/jfhdsjfh34frjkfs23432.hta | |
| hxxps://revivelife[.]in/assets/js/other/grant/ | |
| hxxps://revivelife[.]in/assets/js/other/grant/32476sdfsdafgsdcsd3476328.hta | |
| hxxps://revivelife[.]in/assets/js/support/i/index.php | |
| hxxps://revivelife[.]in/assets/js/support/c/index.php | |
| hxxps://smokeworld[.]in/wp-content/plugins/header-footer-show/01/ | |
| hxxps://smokeworld[.]in/wp-content/plugins/header-footer-show/01/bjihfsdfhdjsh234234.hta | |
| hxxps://smokeworld[.]in/wp-content/plugins/header-footer-other/intro/index.php | |
| hxxps://smokeworld[.]in/wp-content/plugins/header-footer-other/content/index.php | |
| hxxps://vparking[.]online/BetaVersion/MyDesk/assets/fonts/account/show/index.php | |
| hxxps://vparking[.]online/BetaVersion/MyDesk/assets/fonts/account/show/4358437iufgdshvjy5843765.hta | |
| hxxps://vparking[.]online/BetaVersion/MyDesk/plugins/quill/support/intro/ | |
| hxxps://vparking[.]online/BetaVersion/MyDesk/plugins/quill/support/content/index.php | |
| Host | |
| C:\ProgramData\HP\flutter.hta | |
| C:\ProgramData\HP\plugins.hta | |
| C:\ProgramData\HP\min-js.hta | |
| C:\ProgramData\HP\nodejsmin.hta.hta | |
| C:\Users\Public\quick\quick.exe | |
| C:\Users\Public\quick\msdr.dll | |
| C:\Users\Public\quick\quick.bat | |
| C:\Users\Public\issas\issas.exe | |
| C:\Users\Public\issas\braveservice.dll | |
| C:\Users\Public\issas\issas.bat | |
| C:\Users\Public\cove\cove.exe | |
| C:\Users\Public\cove\salso.dll | |
| C:\Users\Public\cove\cove.bat | |
| C:\Users\Public\salso\salso.exe | |
| C:\Users\Public\salso\salso.dll | |
| C:\Users\Public\salso\salso.bat | |
| C:\Users\Public\FI_Ejec1\FI_Ejec1.exe | |
| C:\Users\Public\FI_Ejec1\FI_Ejec1324.dll | |
| C:\Users\Public\FI_Ejec1\FI_Ejec1.bat | |
APT36
| Maldoc | |
| f436aa95838a92b560f4cd1e1c321fe7 | All details.xlam |
| afb24ec01881b91c220fec8bb2f53291 | Imp message from dgms.xlam |
| Base64-zipped Crimson RAT | |
| 7bb8f92770816f488f3a8f6fe25e71a7 | oleObject1.bin |
| 303b75553c5df52af087b5b084d50f98 | oleObject2.bin |
| Crimson RAT | |
| 898df40a8f2a6702c0be059f513fab9d | mulhiar tarsnib.exe |
| e3cf6985446cdeb2c523d2bc5f3b4a32 | mulhiar tarsnib.exe |
| bb5b569b38affb12dfe2ea6d5925e501 | ShareX.exe |
| 7cdc81a0f5c5b2d341de040a92fdd23a | Analytics Based Card.exe |
| 81b436873f678569c46918862576c3e0 | vdhrh madtvin.exe (keylogger) |
| AllaKore RAT (.NET) | |
| e291fffbcb4b873b76566d5345094567 | Mailbird.exe |
| Decoys | |
| 9d337c728c92bdb227055e4757952338 | All details.xlam.xlsx |
| d7b909f611e8f9f454786f9c257f26eb | Imp message from dgms.xlam.xlsx |
| C2 and Ports | |
| 204.44.124[.]134 | 9149, 15597, 18518, 26791, 28329 |
| juichangchi[.]online
176.107.182[.]55 162.245.191[.]214 |
909, 67, 65, 121 |
| 155.94.209[.]4 | 8888, 9009, 33678 |
| Host | |
| C:\Users\<name>\Documents\mulhiar tarsnib.scr | |
| C:\Users\<name>\AppData\Meta-<number>\ | |
| C:\Users\<name>\AppData\mulhiar tarsnib.scr\mulhiar tarsnib.png | |
MITRE ATT&CK
| Tactic | Technique ID | Name |
| Resource Development | T1583.001
T1584.001 T1587.001 T1588.001 T1588.002 T1608.001 T1608.005 |
Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
Compromise Infrastructure: Domains Develop Capabilities: Malware Obtain Capabilities: Malware Obtain Capabilities: Tool Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware Stage Capabilities: Link Target |
| Initial Access | T1566.001
T1566.002 |
Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment
Phishing: Spear phishing Link |
| Execution | T1106
T1129 T1059 T1047 T1204.001 T1204.002 |
Native API
Shared Modules Command and Scripting Interpreter Windows Management Instrumentation User Execution: Malicious Link User Execution: Malicious File |
| Persistence | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
| Defense Evasion | T1027.010
T1036.005 T1036.007 T1140 T1218.005 T1574.002 T1027.009 T1027.010 |
Command Obfuscation
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Masquerading: Double File Extension Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation |
| Discovery | T1012
T1033 T1057 T1083 T1518.001 |
Query Registry
System Owner/User Discovery Process Discovery File and Directory Discovery Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery |
| Collection | T1005
T1056.001 T1074.001 T1119 T1113 T1125 |
Data from Local System
Input Capture: Keylogging Data Staged: Local Data Staging Automated Collection Screen Capture Video Capture |
| Command and Control | T1105
T1571 T1573 T1071.001 |
Ingress Tool Transfer
Non-Standard Port Encrypted Channel Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
| Exfiltration | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Author:
Sathwik Ram Prakki
